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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LA RENE HOLMES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 8988 
P. C. HEIDEBRECHT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
S'T~TEMEN'T OF FACTS 
'The statement of fact which appe'ars in 1the 
app~llant's brief is reasonably straighttforward and 
in accordance with the evidence, with 1the exception 
of that ma:terial which appears beginning on Page 
4 of the 'appellant's brief. 
With 'this material, which begins in the third 
paragraph 'Of Page 4 relating to 'the distance Which 
the plaintiff ha:d walked into Twelfth Street be'fore 
the collisi'on occurred, the respondenrt m us1t disagree. 
'The statement that the plaintiff walked twenty-
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three feet from the south curb of Twelfth Street 
to the point at which she was struck is, it appears, 
a pure supposition on the part of plaintiff's counsel. 
The evidence indicates that the position of the 
plaintiff after the accident was thirteen feet eight 
inches north of the south curb line of Twe1lfth 
Street, and at a position thirty-two feet east of what 
the officers determined to be the point of impact. 
('Tr. 59). 
Further, the officers testified that it was im-
possible to determine the exact point of impact and 
that what they determined to be that point might 
have been three or four feet away. (Tr. 61). 
The investigating officers also testified that 
the accident occurred on the south part of Twelfth 
S'tree't and that the plaintiff was struck by the right 
side of the defendant's car. (Tr. 66). The evidence 
shows that the street is forty-two feet wide and the 
distance from the south curb line to the center line, 
even though it was unmarked, is twenty-one feet. 
(Tr. 67). 
On cross examination officer Vaughn Ander-
son testified that all of the defendant's car was in 
the eastbound lane of traffic, that is, south of the 
imaginary center line of Twelfth Street. He testi-
fied further tha:t in his opinion the defendant's car 
was from six to seven feet wide. (Tr. 68). Thus it 
would appear that the plaintiff had walked not 
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twenty-three feet as counsel indicates in his brief, 
but had walked twenty-one feet minus the six or 
seven feet representing the width of the defendant's 
car, or closer to fourteen or fifteen feet. 
The plaintiff herse'l.f 'testified that as she began 
to cross the street from south to north, she had her 
back slightly turned to traffic approaching from 
the west. ('Tr. 90). She further testified that just 
as she stepped off the south curb, she looked west 
and saw nothing. ('Tr. 91). 
Lieutenant LeRoy G. Bennett was called as an 
expert wi'tness by the plaintiff and appellant. Among 
other things he testified that based upon studies 
he had made, the average woman walked 4.11 feet 
per second. He offered in his testimony some cal-
culations based on the assumption that Mrs. Holmes 
walked at about that speed. 
Based upon his calculations as to the distance 
the automobile would travel at twenty-five miles 
per hour and the distance Mrs. Holmes walked 
before the collision occurred, he testified as to what 
in his opinion was the distance west of the point at 
which Mrs. Holmes was standing on the curb the 
defendant's car was located at the time she left the 
curb. 
He offered these calculations based on certain 
facts submitted 'to him by counsel for the appellant. 
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Upon cross-examination Mr. Young testified 
thrut if she ('the appellant) had walked fifteen feet, 
it would have taken her approximately 3.4·3 seconds 
from the 'time she left the curb to reach the point 
where the collision occurred, and further that the 
defendant's car at the time the appellant left the 
curb and proceeded across the street, was 125.7 4 
feet west of the point of impact. (Tr. 102). 
Based upon the physical evidence it would ap-
pear that approxima!tely three seconds after the 
appellant left the curb and proceeded across the 
stree't, 'the collis~ion occurred and that at the 'time 
she left the curb and said she looked to the west, 
she did n:ot see the defendant's car, which was then 
only 125 feet from her. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COUR'T DID NOT COMMIT ERR'OR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
POIN'T II. 
'THE 'TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
APPELLAN'T'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTJ:ON NO.8. 
·The first point argued by the appeltan't is ap-
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parerrtly that the court erred in g1v1ng Instruc-
tion No. 8. In argument under that point it appears 
thaJt he objeets to the giving of Instruction No. 8 
in view of the court's Ins'tructi'On No. 7 upon the 
theory apparently 'that these instructions coll!tradict 
each other. 
I1t is the position of the respondent tha!t these 
instructions are not contradictory and that 'the evi-
dence clearly shows that based upon ei!ther instruc-
tion or both, the 'appellant was guilty of contri-
butory negligence as a ma:tter of law. 
The appellant takes the position 'that Instruc-
1tion No. 8 was given erroneously and for that 
reason the case should be reversed. Assuming for 
purposes of argument, which fue responden1t does 
not admit, that the instruction was erroneous, it 
does not necessarily invite or require a reversal of 
this case based upon the record. 
The court's attention is inv:i!ted 'to Corpus Juris 
Secundum for a general statement found in v·ol. 
5-A, Paragraph 1763-1 under the ti'tle "Appeal and 
Error": 
"As a general rule, the giving of an er-
roneous instruction will not constitute a 
ground for reversal where 'the complaining 
party has not been injured thereby. A judg-
ment will not be reversed for error 1in the 
giving of instructi'ons where the instructions 
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are erroneous only as to other parties or when 
the erroneous instru~tion is nort only not pre-
judicial but is in fact favorable to the com-
plaining party * * * 
"The principle that a judgment will ndt 
be reversed for error in 'the giving of instruc-
tions, where the complaining party was not 
prejudiced thereby, has also been applied in 
actions for death and personal injuries." 
It is ithe position of the respondent that the 
instru~tions given - that is, '7 and 8 - are not 
prejudicial and that even if, as the appellant con-
tends, Instruction No. 8 were erroneous, it does not 
warrant a revers·al. 
'The :statute upon which Instruction No. 8 is 
based rs 41-6-79, U. C. A. 1953, which reads as 
follows: 
(a) "Every pedestrian crossing at a 
roadway at any point other than within a 
marked crosswalk or within an unm·arked 
crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the 
right-of-way 'to all vehicles upon the road-
way." 
It is apparently the position of the appellant 
that an instruction based upon this statute is wholly 
unintelligible and imposes an unreasonable burden 
upon pedestrians and serves only to confuse jurors 
to whom such an instruction might be given. 
This does not appear to be the view of 'this 
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court because the statute referred to is cited in a 
good many Utah decisions, and in none does this 
court say that the statute cannot be applied or tha;t 
it is unintelligible or that it imposes unreasonable 
burden upon pedestrians. 
The cases we refer 'to include Cox v. Thompson, 
245 P.2d 1049, and Smith v. Bennett, 265 P.2d 401. 
The following quotation in this connection is re-
ferred to from Mr. J us'tice Wolfe's opinion in Cox 
v. Thompson which appears at Page 1051 of 254 
P.2d: 
"On 'the evidence set forth the tri'al court 
correctly found decedent contributorily negli-
gent as a mat'ter of law. From a fair appraisal 
of the evidence reasonable men can draw but 
one inference and that inference points un-
erringly to the negligence of the decedent. 
In response to a call from his wife, decedent, 
who was walking east across a poorly lit 
highway, turned and walked directly into the 
path of defendant's automobile. Crossing a 
highway at a point where there was no mark-
ed crosswalk, decedent was duty bound to yield 
the right of way to a v.ehicle upon the road-
way. See 41-6-79 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
(Emphasis ours.) This he failed to do. He, in 
addi1tion, apparently failed to look, or having 
looked failed to see what he should have seen 
and paid heed to it. He said nothing and did 
nothing which indicated he was in any way 
aware of the danger presented. Decedent was 
properly found negligent as a matter of law." 
At Page 10 of the appellant's brief, a refer-
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ence is made to Morrison v. Perry, 140 P.2d 722. 
~ttention is called to ~he language of the court ap-
pearing on Page 10 of the appellant's brief relating 
to a presumption of negligence when a viola'tion of 
a statute has 'been proved 'and s'ays that the presump-
tion remains unless there is an explana:tion offered 
by the vio'la'tor of the statute. 
W'ith respect to the argument that proof of a 
violation of a statute such as the one in question here 
raises only a presumption of negligence absent an 
exp'lana'tion, the testimony is uncontradicted that 
the plain'tiff could not offer any explanation be-
cause she fl'atly said that she never did see the de-
fendant's car. (Tr. 91). 
A't Page 12 of the appellant's brief there ap-
pears a quo:tation from 88 C.J.S., Page 903, relating 
to error committed when instructions give improper 
and undue emphasis to specific issues, theories, or 
defenses. It is the contention of the respondent that 
'the two instructions about which the 'appellant com-
plains do not constitu'te an unnecessary or unusual 
em ph'asis upon one phase of the case or place un-
necessary emphasis upon the respondent's theory of 
the case and tha't the respondent had a perfect right 
to have these instructions 'submitted to the jury. 
This court's attention is invited 'to the case of 
Bruner v. McCarthy, 142 P.2d 649. This was an 
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action for personal injuries to the plaintiff, a host-
ler, while assisting in the coaling of an engine. 
Verdict and judgment were entered for the plain-
tiff, and the defendant appealed, claiming, among 
other things, that the defendant had been prejudiced 
by the giving of instructions cTaimed 'to be erroneous. 
One instruction complained of was reiative to 'the 
safety appliance section of the Federal Employer's 
Li'ability kct, and i't was ·adm'i!tted thaJt no safety 
appliance vidlation was 'involved . 
. 
Wrth respect to this contention, the court, in 
the opinion at Page 654, of 142 Pac. has 1the follow-
ing to say: 
"The next contention is that the lower 
court comn1itted prejudicial error in giving 
instructions on abstract princip'les of law 
which were outside the issues and the evi-
dence. Objection is m·ade to th'a!t portion of 
instruction 7 in which the court read to the 
jury part of the Federal Employers' Lia:biHty 
Ac't 'including tha:t part which related 1to the 
carrier's l'i'ability for injuries resulting from 
'any defect or insufficiency, due to Its (the 
carrier's) negligence in its cars, engines, ·ap-
pliances, machinery, track, ro'adbed, work 
boa1ts, wharves or other equipment. Adm'!t-
tedly there were no issues or evidence pur-
porting to deal with defec'ts of insufficienCies. 
It would have been better had this portion of 
the instruction been om:ltted. Y elt we do ndt 
think 'tha:t this was prejudicial error. A simi-
lar objection was made in K~tsturin v. Chicago 
& Alton R. Co., 209 Ill. App. 55, where the 
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court stated: 'The third instruction given at 
appellee's request stated the substance of 1the 
entire Federal Employers' Liability Act, in-
cluding provisions therein not involved in this 
case. We 'think the portion objected to might 
well have been omitted, as said by us in a 
former case, 'but still we do not think the 
jury could have been misled to believe that 
appellee could recover here for any defect 
in appellant's track or roadbed.' '' 
The appel'lant in the Bruner case further com-
plained 'that an instruction was given respecting 
f'ailure 'to keep the roadbed in proper condition. As 
was the case w':Lth the safety appliance instruction, 
there was no evidence of improperly maintained 
roadbed or that such a condition might have had 
anything 'to do with the accident which injured 'the 
plaintiff. 
With respeet to this contention the court said: 
"'The defendants contend that the jury 
may have concluded from this instruction that 
defendants were charged with negligence in 
failing to keep their equipment and roadbed 
in proper condition. It could not so have con-
cluded where 'there was no evidence remotely 
showing any such negligence. Moreover, since 
we have concluded that the evidence shows 
negligence on the part of the defendants as 
a!bove demonstrated as a matter of law, we 
therefore must conclude that there could be 
no prejudi'cial error in 'this regard." 
Other instructions relating to issues not in-
10 
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volved in the case were submitted by the court, 
dbjected to by the appellant, bu!t the cour1t rejected 
the appellant's contentions, holding that they were 
not prejudicial, and the court says the following 
with respect to these addi1tion'al contentions by the 
appellant: 
"Likewise there was no prejudicial error 
in instructing the jury on rules of 'the ·road 
even though those rules may have been in-
applicable to 'the i'ssues raised. Such an in-
struction could have on'ly had the effect of 
influencing the jury to believe that the de-
fendants were negligent in failing to enforce 
the rules. Since we have held that the defen-
dants were negligent in other respects as a 
matter of law, they could. not have been pre-
judiced by this instruction. 
"The same holds true as to ins'truction 
11 on the ''assum p'tion of risk' doctrine. No 
such issue was raised by 'the pleadings or the 
evidence and no good purpose could have been 
served by the giving of such an instruction. 
Yet this could not 'be prejudicial to the de-
fendants, for even if 'the jury inferred from 
the giving of such an instruction 1that 'the 
doctrine of 'assumption of risk' applied, the 
defendants could ndt have been prejudiced. 
If they had thought that the pl'aintiff h'ad 
possibly assumed the risk, it would have been 
'to the defendan1ts' benefit, not to their dis-
advantage or prejudice." 
The respondent su'bmfts that the Bruner case 
represents one of the bes't discussions by this cour't 
11 
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Wi1th respect to contentions of the kind made by the 
appellant in this case tha:t the appelliant was pre-
judiced by the giving of the court's irrstrudtions 
referred to. 
POINT II. 
THE 'TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
It is 1the position of the respondent tha:t the 
plaintiff was by no means prejudiced by the instruc-
tions complained of and that upon all the evidence 
the case was properly submitted by the court. on the 
basis of these instructions, and the plaintiff's mo-
tion for a new trial should have been denied. 
!The principal part of the argument under this 
point has been presented in the argument under 
Point I because in essence they ~are part of the s·ame 
proposrtion. 
'The respondent again submits to the court that 
based upon the record :the a~tivity of the plaintiff 
in crossing the street and either not looking in the 
direction from which the defendant's automobile 
proceeded or having looked, failing to see what there 
to be seen, she was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of taw under either Instruction No. 7 
or Instruction No. 8. 
Based upon the physical evidence presented and 
the 'testimony of the appellant's expert witness, the 
appellant was s'truck approxim~ately three seconds 
12 
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after she left the curb by an automobile which was 
no more 'than 125 feet from her a:t a time she claimed 
she looked and failed to see 'i't there. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon a fair appraisal of the testimony, 
physical evidence and the record presented by this 
appeal, the respondentt respectfully submits 'to the 
court 'that the verdict and judgment thereon ap-
pealed from should be affirmed. 
RespectfuHy submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
Salt Lake Ci'ty, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
13 
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